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I. INTRODUCTION2
Since its first appearance in 1798 in Supreme Court jurisprudence,3
Publius’ The Federalist has been cited in Supreme Court opinions hundreds
of times.4 The frequency of citations has increased in the last half century,
with a marked jump in Federalist citations through the 1970s and into the
1980s.5 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts cited The Federalist more
extensively than any of the Courts that preceded them, with the Rehnquist
Court citing The Federalist even more frequently than the Burger Court.6 The
Roberts Court continues to cite frequently to The Federalist, as demonstrated
by the 2014–2015 term, during which no fewer than eleven cases (and even
more individual opinions) cited it.7
There is some disagreement among scholars as to the importance of
The Federalist in Supreme Court decisions. Durchslag, for one, is skeptical
of its importance to cases’ outcomes.8 Melton disagrees, noting that
Durchslag’s is the minority view.9 What is clear, however, is that citations to
The Federalist have increased dramatically over the last forty years. And
even Durchslag concludes his paper with the caveat that:
[O]ne cannot dismiss citations to The Federalist as windowdressing even when they might appear to be so. . . . The
Federalist might lend credibility to the Court, to the particular
opinion, or to the author of a particular opinion. . . . Citing
2
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (quotation marks
omitted). In its proper context, the word “more” in the title attaches to “patrons,” and refers to a greater
number. As excerpted in my title, “more” gains the impression of attaching to “enlightened,” which
changes the phrase’s meaning. The altered meaning renders the phrase a fitting pun for this paper’s title,
both because of the meaning of the manipulated phrase and because in using the excerpt, I do the very
thing for which I criticize Justice Scalia in this paper: taking portions of The Federalist out of context.
Though I am critical in this paper, my time spent parsing Justice Scalia’s writing has deepened my
admiration for his captivating writing style and his passion in rendering patriotic service. I posit he would
have taken no offense at the playful suggestion in my title that Hamilton and Madison are “more
enlightened patrons of liberty” than he, as I imagine he might question if there are any “more enlightened”
with respect to political liberty than the two principle authors of The Federalist.
3
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798).
4
Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A Citation List and Analysis, 17891996, 85 KY. L.J. 243, 251 (1997).
5
Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Jennifer J. Miller, The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A Supplement,
1996-2001, 90 KY. L.J. 415, 416 (2002).
6
Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here Than
Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 312 (2005).
7
Eleven cases represents just over one-seventh (11/76) of the Supreme Court’s caseload from that
year. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct.
1225 (2015); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338
(2015); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135
S. Ct. 1656 (2015); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015); Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
8
Durchslag, supra note 6, at 313 (stating, “[I]t is hard to come up with more than a small handful of
cases where The Federalist even arguably played a decisive role in the Court's decision.”).
9
Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Carol Willcox Melton, The Supreme Court and the Federalist: A
Supplement, 2001-2006, 95 KY. L.J. 749, 751–52 (2007).
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“the Framers” generally and The Federalist Papers
particularly is the secular equivalent to citing the Bible. It is
an appeal to a higher and more revered authority. It not only
establishes an ethos of objectivity but the perception of
infallibility.10
This Article will provide close readings of a number of Supreme
Court decisions that cite to The Federalist, juxtaposed with close attention to
The Federalist itself. A comprehensive close reading of the Supreme Court’s
use of The Federalist is a task for a long book, so this Article has a limiting
factor: it will focus specifically on Justice Scalia’s use of The Federalist
throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court. There are a number of reasons
to focus on Justice Scalia. Foremost is the sheer number of times Justice
Scalia has cited The Federalist. As of the end of the 2001 term, Justice Scalia
was “among the heaviest users of The Federalist in the Court’s entire
history.”11 After the 2006 term, Melton noted that, “Scalia and Clarence
Thomas continue to be among those who cite to the essays most heavily.”12
Justice Scalia’s several uses of The Federalist in Canning in 2014, and his
citations to it in five cases from the 2014–2015 term,13 demonstrate that
Publius’ influence endured in his jurisprudence throughout his tenure on the
Court.14
Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy is a second reason he was chosen
for this close reading of his Federalist citations. In declaring himself an
adherent of “originalism,” Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he purpose of
constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting
certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution
thinks fundamentally undesirable.”15 Since The Federalist is historical
material that could help understand “the society [that] adopt[ed] the
Constitution[,]” it seems to be particularly useful for an originalist
constitutional interpreter.16 In interviews, Justice Scalia has made clear that
he indeed does have a reverential attitude toward The Federalist, and
considers them crucial to understanding the Constitution and its formative
period.17 In an interview with C-SPAN, he was asked, “[H]ow would you
10

Durchslag, supra note 6, at 315.
Melton, Jr. & Miller, supra note 5, at 417.
12
Melton, Jr. & Melton, supra note 9, at 749 (emphasis added).
13
See Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015); King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In all of these cases except
Zivotosky, Justice Scalia only cited The Federalist once. Perhaps a sequel to this Article will discuss
Zivotosky and any other cases not addressed herein.
14
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Inter
Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013); NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2595
(2014).
15
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., C-SPAN, Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia, YOUTUBE (July 19, 2012), https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=sXynIZOtKkg.
11
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want the constitution taught in high schools?”18 He responded: “Well, first of
all, I am appalled that Americans get out of high school, get out of college,
even get out of law school without ever having read the [F]ederalist
[P]apers.”19 He continued:
[T]hing number one, if - if you want to have the proper
respect, and indeed awe that you ought to have for the United
States Constitution - thing number one is to realize how
brilliant were the men who put that piece of work together
and that shines through in the Federalist Papers.20
To be sure, Justices of all judicial persuasions cite to The Federalist.21
Melton’s study also noted that Justice Stevens, not an originalist and
traditionally thought to be among the Court’s liberal wing, was “among the
heaviest users of The Federalist in the Court's entire history.”22 Indeed,
during the Rehnquist Court, Justice Stevens seems to have cited The
Federalist in even more opinions than Justice Scalia.23 Intriguingly, however,
Justice Stevens only cited The Federalist in one opinion during his ten terms
on the Burger Court24 (i.e. before Justice Scalia joined the Court), providing
some evidence that his increased use of The Federalist was due to a changed
tenor in the Court, and the addition of a particular Justice who acknowledges
The Federalist as a key to understanding the Constitution.25
These factors explain why this Article will focus particularly on
Justice Scalia’s use of The Federalist. In doing so, the paper may also attend
to other Justices’ uses of The Federalist in cases in which Justice Scalia cites
to it. In some cases, such as Printz, Justices openly debate the meaning and
significance of a number of the papers in The Federalist.26
A note about method: this Article will generally eschew delving into
other sources from the founding period, or historical work on the persons
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. The paper will focus primarily on
the text of The Federalist itself, and will generally assess the work—in its
entire context and with caveats—as the work of “Publius.” Most Supreme
Court opinions cite The Federalist in this way—i.e. without much regard to
the actual author. This comports with what seems to be a clear reason why
The Federalist has endured: that in part because of the later disagreements
18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Matthew J. Festa, Dueling Federalists: Supreme Court Decisions with Multiple Opinions Citing the
Federalist, 1986-2007, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 78 (2007). “[T]he frequency of multiple citations to
The Federalist is not linked to any one ideological persuasion, liberal or conservative, among the Justices.”
Id. at 99.
22
Melton, Jr. & Miller, supra note 5, at 417.
23
Durchslag, supra note 6, at 307.
24
Id.
25
Melton, Jr. & Melton, supra note 9, at 749.
26
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 911–13 (1997).
19
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between Hamilton and Madison, their work on The Federalist (despite some
potential internal inconsistencies) reflects a unified understanding of the
fundamentals of the Constitution, which may be viewed as deeper and more
lasting than attitudes to particularized and temporary political issues. This
Article may, however, briefly refer to Hamilton and Madison, the persons,
when dealing with the Printz case—where the distinction between the two
becomes relevant.
This Article will focus on eleven cases in which Justice Scalia has
cited to The Federalist (the actual number of such cases is much greater, but
in most instances, The Federalist plays no significant role).27 The cases are
divided into three parts. Part II discusses six cases that deal with the
separation of powers. This is the area in which Justice Scalia has most
extensively cited The Federalist, and this Part will take up the greatest portion
of the Article. Part III discusses two cases that deal with issues of federalism,
or the relationship between the federal and state governments. Part IV deals
with three miscellaneous cases that fall into neither the separation of powers
nor the federalism umbrella. Part V will offer brief summary thoughts.
Though this Article critically analyzes Justice Scalia’s use of The
Federalist in particular, there are other related themes. The piece will provide
some context for the use of The Federalist in general in the Supreme Court,
highlight passages from The Federalist that may have been relevant but
overlooked in recent Supreme Court cases, and offer a window into some
aspects of the Court’s separation of powers and federalism jurisprudences and
their relations to The Federalist. With respect to the principle inquiry, the
Article concludes that Justice Scalia has often plucked portions of The
Federalist out of context in order to support a particular view of the
Constitution’s original meaning and intent. He also avoids passages from The
Federalist that cut against his views. I do not mean to suggest that Justice
Scalia does this intentionally or maliciously. The Federalist’s eighty-four
papers comprise a long work, and the originalist judge’s job of ascertaining
original meaning is, to quote Justice Scalia himself, “exceedingly difficult[,]”
because “[p]roperly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous
mass of material -- in the case of the Constitution and its Amendments, for
example, to mention only one element, the records of the ratifying debates in
all the states.”28 But whether it is improper contextualization of an elegant
phrase, or ignorance of or inattention to conflicting material, Justice Scalia’s
27
Durchslag, supra note 6, at 297. Indeed, Durchslag thinks that The Federalist was significant in
only six of Justice Scalia’s opinions as of 2005. Id. I think the number may be a little higher through 2005,
and certainly more so through the present day.
28
Scalia, supra note 15, at 856–57 (“Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of
that material --many of the reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to be quite unreliable.
And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time -somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs,
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes
better suited to the historian than the lawyer.”).
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use of The Federalist demonstrates that his own professed “principle defect”
of originalism—“that historical research is always difficult and sometimes
inconclusive”—is the conduit through which originalism, like any other
theory of constitutional interpretation, can provide for “[t]he inevitable
tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it to be . . .
.”29 But unlike any other interpretive theory that, to Justice Scalia, might
“come[] as a wolf[,]”30 originalism wears the sheep’s clothing of
“establish[ing] a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from
the preferences of the judge himself.”31 As Justice Scalia’s use of The
Federalist demonstrates, historical criteria are not always so removed from a
judge’s preferences.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.
During Justice Scalia’s first term on the Court, he presaged his
famous lone-dissent a year later in Morrison v. Olson.32 In Young, the Court
faced the following issue: the petitioners had been enjoined by a district court
from using Louis Vuitton’s trademarks belonging to the respondent.33 After
finding probable cause that the petitioners were violating the injunction, the
respondent’s attorney asked the court for a special appointment to prosecute
contempt of court on behalf of the United States, pursuant to Federal Rule
42(a)(2).34 The district court appointed the respondent’s attorney, and the
petitioners were eventually convicted of criminal contempt.35 They appealed
to the Second Circuit, arguing that the appointment of Louis Vuitton’s
attorney as prosecutor violated their right to be prosecuted by an impartial
prosecutor.36 The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions.37
Four members of the Supreme Court found that the appointment was
invalid per se because of the appointment of an interested party’s attorney,38
while three members agreed that the appointment raised suspicions, but
disagreed with a per se rule and wanted to remand the case to see if the
appointment was “harmless error.”39 Justice White, in a one-paragraph
dissent, noted the “district court’s well-established authority to appoint
29

Id. at 864.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia, supra note 15, at 864.
32
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 789 (1987).
34
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2) (“The court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney
for the government, unless the interest of justice requires the appointment of another attorney. If the
government declines the request, the court must appoint another attorney to prosecute the contempt.”).
35
Young, 481 U.S. at 790.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 793.
38
Id. at 814.
39
Id. at 825–27 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30
31
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private counsel to prosecute should be exercised only after [the United States
Attorney] declines to prosecute[]” and also noted that he would prefer courts
not to appoint interested attorneys.40 He nonetheless thought that Federal Rule
42(a)(2) authorized such an appointment, and he preferred to leave necessary
amendments to the rulemaking process.41 Ultimately, Justice White agreed
with the Court of Appeals that there was “no error, constitutional or otherwise,
in the appointments made in this action . . . .”42
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to
disagree on constitutional grounds with the plurality, the three-member
concurrence, and Justice White’s dissent.43 Justice Scalia thought that
appointing a prosecutor is not part of the “judicial power” of Article III, and
hence thought the appointments were constitutionally invalid.44 Justice Scalia
took issue with the rest of the Court, which found uncontroversial the ability
of a court to initiate contempt proceedings.45 The majority explained its
reasoning for this traditionally-executive power (on this point the threemember concurrence joined the plurality): “The ability to punish
disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the
Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority . . . .”46 Justice Scalia
disagreed, arguing that having the judiciary depend on the executive for the
efficacy of its judgments was not absurd as the majority would have it, but in
fact “a carefully designed and critical element of our system of
Government.”47 Justice Scalia went on to discuss how the executive and
legislature depend on each other, and then asked “[w]hy, one must wonder,
are the courts alone immune from this interdependence?”48 Immediately after
posing this question, Justice Scalia answered, “[t]he Founding Fathers, of a
certainty, thought that they were not.”49
As his sole piece of evidence for the attitudes of the Founding
Fathers, Justice Scalia then cited a block quote from No. 78 of The
Federalist50—the section that includes the line that the judiciary “must
40

Id. at 827 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 815–16 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 795 (majority opinion). “The Rule’s assumption that private attorneys may be used to
prosecute contempt actions reflects the longstanding acknowledgment that the initiation of contempt
proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is a part of the judicial function.” Id.
46
Id. at 796.
47
Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48
Id. at 817–18.
49
Id. at 818.
50
Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he judiciary, from
the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. . . . The judiciary . . . has no influence over
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can
take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.”) (emphasis added).
41
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ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.”51 Justice Scalia ended the first part of his opinion one
paragraph later, and went on to his refutation of the majority’s case law
analysis in Parts II and III of his opinion.52 Ultimately, it seems that Justice
Scalia’s view in this case was driven by his sense of the nature of the
separation of powers; he apparently could not abide the judiciary having the
power to prosecute, even if limited to contempt.
Though Justice Scalia only cited one of The Federalist papers, and
provided little discussion of it, that paper played a prominent role in Young in
that Justice Scalia used it as the only piece of evidence that the original
understanding of the Constitution’s separation of powers would oppose the
judiciary initiating contempt proceedings.53 But Justice Scalia may have
taken this quote from No. 78 out of context. In the larger section that contains
the portion quoted by Justice Scalia, Publius defends the notion of life tenure
for federal judges.54 His audience is one that fears judicial power being
abused; Publius’ purpose in this passage is to placate those fears. It makes
sense rhetorically, then, for Publius to use language denigrating the judicial
power. By taking a portion of this defense of life tenure out of context, Justice
Scalia used the passage to speak on a completely different, and much more
narrow issue—whether judges can appoint prosecutors for criminal contempt
actions.55
Ironically, in the paragraph that immediately followed his Federalist
quotation, Justice Scalia undercut his very argument that the judiciary in this
instance is using too much executive power. Responding to the Court’s
defense of the practice at issue on the grounds that it helps a court preserve
authority, Justice Scalia wrote:
If the courts must be able to investigate and prosecute
contempt of their judgments, why must they not also be able
to arrest and punish those whom they have adjudicated to be
in contempt? Surely the Executive’s refusal to enforce a
judgment of contempt would impair the efficacy of the
court’s acts at least as much as its failure to investigate and
prosecute a contempt. Yet no one has ever supposed that the
Judiciary has an inherent power to arrest and incarcerate.56
By noting that a court, even after appointing a prosecutor and delivering a
guilty judgment on criminal contempt, is still dependent on the executive to
“arrest and punish” those guilty of contempt, Justice Scalia himself
51
52
53
54
55
56

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
Young, 481 U.S. at 818–19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 818.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
Young, 481 U.S. at 817–18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 818.
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demonstrated that a court still “ultimately depend[s] upon the aid of the
executive arm . . . for the efficacy of its judgments[,]”57 even if it can appoint
a prosecutor in contempt proceedings. Trying to trip up the majority, Justice
Scalia tripped himself.
Indeed, further exploration of No. 78 reveals that it might better be
read as supporting the narrow leeway the majority gives to judges.
Immediately after the portion Justice Scalia quoted, Publius begins the next
paragraph by stating that, “[t]his simple view of the matter suggests several
important consequences.”58 At first blush, this description of the very text
Justice Scalia quoted, demonstrates that Publius thought it vague and
incomplete.
And indeed Publius continues, describing one of the
consequences of “this simple view” of the judiciary: “It proves . . . that the
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments . . . and
that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their
attacks.”59 At the end of the same paragraph Publius writes that, “from the
natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches . . . .”60
Though these portions of No. 78 are intended to defend life tenure
and cannot speak conclusively to the issue before the Court in Young, they
certainly seem to be consistent with the power of a court to appoint a
prosecutor for criminal contempt. The power could be seen as one of defense,
in that it gives a court power over those involved in litigation in instances in
which the executive does not or cannot (maybe because of a towering
caseload) come to the court’s aid. Surely litigants would be at least somewhat
deterred by such a power in the court, not wishing to rely on the mercy of the
executive after a judgment. Indeed, this power in the court is consistent with
the portion of No. 78 quoted by Justice Scalia, since, as Justice Scalia
conceded, appointing a prosecutor cannot ultimately effectuate any
judgment.61 In any case, such a power might not even disrupt the power
relations between the branches at all, as the executive might appreciate the
benefit of allowing a court—in a narrow set of cases—to take some of its load.
In sum, Young reveals Justice Scalia citing The Federalist for a broad
claim about the views of the Founding Fathers as a whole. The Founding
Fathers’ views in this case are crucial for Justice Scalia, as his opinion rests
on the fact that the judiciary as originally understood in the founding period
cannot exercise executive powers. But, as Justice Scalia himself inadvertently
helped to demonstrate, the power at issue did not actually conflict with the
57

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 465–66.
60
Id. at 466.
61
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 818 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
58
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text of The Federalist that he quoted and italicized. Indeed, the broader
context in No. 78 might even support the opposite conclusion.62
B. Morrison v. Olson
A year after Young, the Court decided Morrison.63 Justice Scalia
dissented alone.64 A quarter-century later, in the fall of 2013, Justice Scalia
called this the most “wrenching” case during his time on the Court.65 Scholars
have noted the case’s importance,66 a notion supported by the number of
citations to it in recent Supreme Court cases on the Appointments Clause and
separation of powers.67
In Morrison, the Court was faced with Appointments Clause and
separation of powers challenges to the office of “independent counsel.”68 The
Act authorizing the independent counsel69 requires the Attorney General to
conduct a preliminary investigation upon receiving information that certain
federal officials might have violated federal criminal law.70 If the Attorney
General determines that “there are no reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation is warranted,” he must simply notify the Special Division
court, thereby ending the matter.71 If, however, the Attorney General cannot
make that determination, then he must submit the relevant information to the
Special Division, after which the Division must appoint an independent
counsel to investigate the potential criminal violations.72 The independent
counsel is granted “full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of
Justice[] . . . .”73 The independent counsel can be removed by impeachment,
62
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton); see Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia quoted
the same passage from No. 78 in his dissent in Casey. Id. In that case, Justice Scalia uses No. 78 to make
a different point, which is that the Court was substituting its own views for that of the legislature. Id.
Really, however, Justice Scalia had a problem with the Court’s interpretation of the due process clause and
application of stare decisis. Id. In any case, the “FORCE” and “WILL” of No. 78 refer more to the force of
executive power, and the will of legislating along with the “purse.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note
2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). With respect to Casey, the Court still needed the “executive arm . . . for
the efficacy of its judgments.” Id.
63
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
64
Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com
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or by the Attorney General “for good cause.”74
The Court dismissed the Appointments Clause challenge (on the
grounds that the independent counsel is not appointed by the President) by
finding the independent counsel to be an “inferior officer,” and therefore
amenable to appointment by “Courts of Law.”75 The Court offered three
reasons for inferior officer status: the independent counsel is subject to
removal by a higher officer;76 the independent counsel can only perform
“certain, limited duties[;]”77 and the office is “limited in jurisdiction . . . to
certain federal officials suspected of certain serious federal crimes[] . . . .”78
The Court dismissed a further challenge that having the Special Division
define the jurisdiction of the independent counsel is an improper exercise of
power by the judiciary, by holding that in all, the Special Division does “not
impermissibly trespass upon the authority of the Executive Branch[,]” in part
because the Special Division has no supervisory power over the independent
counsel.79 The Court dismissed a challenge to the “good cause” limitation on
the Attorney General’s removal power, noting that it does not “interfere
impermissibly with [the President’s] constitutional obligation to ensure the
faithful execution of the laws.”80 The Court also dismissed a separation of
powers challenge to the entire law on the grounds that Congress did not try to
increase its own power, nor did it give the judiciary executive power, since
the Special Division can only appoint the counsel upon request of the
Attorney General, and cannot review a decision to not request appointment.81
Finally, the Court held that since the counsel can only be appointed after a
request by the Attorney General, and the facts submitted by the Attorney
General help define the counsel’s jurisdiction, the Executive Branch retains
“sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President
is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”82
Before delving into Justice Scalia’s use of The Federalist, it is worth
briefly summarizing his main points of disagreement. Strongly affirming his
premise that “all of the executive power” must be vested in the President,
Justice Scalia responded to the portions of the majority that found sufficient
executive control over the independent counsel.83 He argued that practically,
the Attorney General has no choice but to seek the counsel’s appointment,
because he would be unable to defend the proposition that there are “no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
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warranted.”84 Justice Scalia pointed to the facts of the case before the Court,
and noted that in the face of a 3,000 page indictment from Congress, the
Attorney General really has no choice, even though the Special Division
cannot review his decision, since “Congress is not prevented from reviewing
it[]” and “[t]he context of this statute is acrid with the smell of threatened
impeachment.”85
Having disputed the notion of executive control prior to the
appointment, Justice Scalia also disputed the Court’s view that the Attorney
General (and thereby the President) has control over the counsel.86 He noted
that, “limiting removal power to ‘good cause’ is an impediment to, not an
effective grant of, Presidential control.”87 Justice Scalia ultimately found that
the Act “weaken[s] the Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff[]” and
“enfeebles [the President] more directly in his constant confrontations with
Congress, by eroding his public support[]” through engulfing his staff in
criminal suspicion.88
In Morrison, Justice Scalia cited seven papers for a total of twelve
citations to The Federalist.89 Five of these citations appear in his prologue, a
paean to the separation of powers.90 After quoting the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he Framers of the Federal
Constitution similarly viewed the principle of separation of powers as the
absolutely central guarantee of a just Government.”91 He then cited No. 47 of
The Federalist for support, quoting Publius’s line that “[n]o political truth is
certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more
enlightened patrons of liberty.”92 But this selection seems puzzling, for
Publius continues: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands[] . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”93 That political truth of the greatest intrinsic value,
then, is not any particular arrangement of powers, nor does it proscribe the
sharing of some power. The point is that no one entity should have all the
power. Surely Justice Scalia knew this to be No. 47’s true meaning.
Nonetheless, he quotes this citation as an out-of-context rhetorical flourish.
Justice Scalia, after noting that the separation of powers is expressed
in the first sections of the Constitution’s first three Articles, then quoted Nos.
73 and 51 to the effect that the Framers recognized the need for checks to
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
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keep the separation.94 He ended a sizeable block quote from No. 51 with
Publius’s line that “[a]s the weight of the legislative authority requires that it
should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the
other hand, that it should be fortified.”95 Justice Scalia then argued that the
major “fortification” is the veto power, but that the unity of the executive is
another.96 Justice Scalia’s point here is that by inserting an officer into the
executive branch, who (according to Justice Scalia) is not subject to the
President, Congress has thereby removed one of the President’s fortifications,
and usurped power for itself.
Two points come to mind initially. The first is, if the “major
fortification” for the President is the veto power, then why not rely on the
President to veto this legislation in the first place? The Court cannot exercise
his checking and balancing powers for him. Secondly, after multiple citations
to The Federalist, including a long block quote, it seems suspicious that
Justice Scalia provided no support (from The Federalist or elsewhere) for the
point that unity in the executive serves separation of powers interests. The
reasons for unity in the executive, as explained in No. 70 of The Federalist,
are to provide the necessary energy and responsibility for the executive
branch.97 Though these factors might in turn fortify the separation of powers,
this chain of reasoning demonstrates that should a small incursion into the
executive’s unity not interfere with the requisite energy or responsibility to
the people, then, at least according to the reasons given in The Federalist,
such an incursion would not undermine the interests served by unity.
More problematic, however, was Justice Scalia’s decision to leave
out a line from his block quote of No. 51. In the opinion, he left in the portion
that notes that the “remedy” for the “inconveniency” of the dominance of the
legislature is bicameralism.98 Justice Scalia then inserted an ellipsis to replace
the following line: “It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous
encroachments by still further precautions.”99 If Justice Scalia read The
Federalist like he does statutes, then he cannot avoid the interpretation that
this passage says that bicameralism is the essential check on the legislature,
while further precautions “may” be necessary.100 To his credit, Justice Scalia
left in the line that “the weakness of the executive may require[] . . . that it
should be fortified[,]”101 though he ignores the word “may” again. Publius
goes on to describe the “further precaution” that “may” be necessary—the
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veto.102 He says nothing about the unity of the executive. All in all, it seems
fair to say that Justice Scalia strained in his effort to find support in The
Federalist for the essential nature of an absolutely unitary executive to the
separation of powers.
Later in his opinion, explaining that Congress is not entitled to the
benefit of the doubt as to the constitutionality of its work, Justice Scalia noted
that where Congress and the executive disagree, neither gets the presumption
of constitutionality.103 In support of this point, Justice Scalia cited the portion
of No. 49 of The Federalist where Publius writes that “[t]he several
departments being perfectly co-ordinate . . . [none] can pretend to an exclusive
or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers .
. . . ”104 It is notable that Justice Scalia did not explain why the judiciary is
not bound to this line, but ultimately there is no point to, since the quoted
portion is part of a hypothesis Publius entertains from Jefferson’s Notes on
the State of Virginia.105 It takes the line out of context to apply it as if it were
Publius’s (or Madison’s, as Scalia stated) studied view. In fact, when Publius
goes on to reject Jefferson’s argument for regular appeals to the people, it
might even be that Publius rejects the Jeffersonian premise about the perfect
coordination of the departments.
After rejecting the office of independent counsel on general
separation of powers grounds, Justice Scalia argued that the appointment was
invalid anyway, since the counsel is not an “inferior” officer, and thereby
needs to be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate.106 In this
discussion, Justice Scalia used The Federalist, not for broad, grand
proclamations of support, but in order to ascertain the original meaning of the
word “inferior.” Justice Scalia used No. 81, where Publius describes
“inferior” federal courts as “subordinate” to the Supreme Court, as evidence
that “inferior” officers must be subordinate to another executive officer.107
Though it is not clear that “subordinate” in the sense of subject-to-being-fired
and “subordinate” in the sense of subject-to-appellate-review are necessarily
the same thing, this instance nonetheless demonstrates Justice Scalia using
The Federalist as a low-key, textual interpretation device, rather than as a
store of vague tribute to the separation of powers.
Justice Scalia’s final use of The Federalist in Morrison is No. 70,
which he quoted to demonstrate that unity in the executive helps the people
determine responsibility.108 This is important for Justice Scalia in Morrison
because as long as the President retains control of prosecutors, there is a
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
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Morrison, 487 U.S. at 704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mechanism to keep prosecutors in check—as Scalia says, “the unfairness will
come home to roost in the Oval Office.”109 These considerations apply more
acutely to a first-term president, and would be of more force in a presidency
without term-limits, which is what The Federalist assumed.110 In any case,
the issue of responsibility is slightly different in the Morrison context.
Objection to a plural executive on the grounds “that it tends to conceal faults
and destroy responsibility[]”111 is premised on the notion that it is hard to tell
who to blame when multiple people are involved in making the same decision.
It is a different situation, however, when there is simply a small carve-out of
executive decision-making. In the Morrison situation, for example, if the
independent counsel did something objectionable, the public would know
who was responsible because of the specified and limited nature of the office
(and could then hold Congress responsible for the independent counsel’s
authorization). Similarly, in any context outside of investigating particular
executive officers, the public would still be able to hold the President
accountable. Morrison does not present a situation in which Congress tried
to multiply the number of people sharing responsibility with the President for
a broad range of executive decisions. No one would blame the independent
counsel for a foreign policy gaffe. So Justice Scalia’s citations to No. 70
demonstrated at least a temporary misapprehension of the accountability
problem with a plural executive.
In Morrison, Justice Scalia used a number of papers from The
Federalist in a few different ways: he used them as evidence of the importance
of the separation of powers to the Framers, as a textualist tool, and as a gloss
on the purpose of unity in the executive. Unfortunately, he misapplied these
papers in a number of ways as well: he took a quote out of its context, replaced
unhelpful language with an ellipsis, made a strained parallel between different
kinds of subordination, and simply misunderstood The Federalist’s point
about a plural executive.
C. Mistretta v. United States
In Mistretta, the Court found that separation of powers did not
prevent Congress from delegating the formation of sentencing guidelines,
consistent with statutory guidance, to a body of judges within the Judicial
Branch.112 Once again, Justice Scalia dissented alone.113 Justice Scalia did
not make affirmative use of The Federalist in this opinion, though he did cite
to it once in order to respond to the majority. The majority quoted No. 47 to
highlight that separation of powers is not rigid, excerpting the selection that
109
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separation of powers “d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to
have no partial agency in, or no controul [sic] over the acts of each other[] . .
. .”114 Justice Scalia responded to this use by arguing that Publius’s
point was that the commingling specifically provided for in
the structure that he and his colleagues had designed -- the
Presidential veto over legislation, the Senate’s confirmation
of executive and judicial officers, the Senate’s ratification of
treaties, the Congress’ power to impeach and remove
executive and judicial officers -- did not violate a proper
understanding of separation of powers.115
This interpretation is a stretch. The entire context surrounding that quote
about “partial agency” is a discussion of Montesquieu and theory.116 None of
the specific powers that Justice Scalia mentioned are discussed in Nos. 47
through 50, with the Presidential veto finally discussed in No. 51.117 Victoria
Nourse, in a thorough and well-considered analysis of Nos. 47 through 51,
demonstrates convincingly that these portions of The Federalist, contra
Justice Scalia, are not about “supplying opposite and rival departmental
powers[,]” but supplying “opposite and rival interests . . . .”118 Does Justice
Scalia really think, as he stated in Mistretta, that Publius was wedded to
particular mechanisms of separation, rather than to a fundamental notion of
using whatever mechanisms happen to be necessary to keep the various
branches in their functional places? Given his deep reverence for the Framers,
it is strange that Justice Scalia, at least in Mistretta, seemed to think they were
more concerned with the structural particulars of their Constitution, rather
than the values those particulars served then and now.
D. Freytag v. C.I.R.
In Freytag, the Court held that Congress’s grant of authority to the
Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court to appoint special trial judges
comported with the Constitution’s separation of powers.119 Justice Scalia,
joined by three other Justices in this case, concurred, writing:
I agree with the Court that a special trial judge is an “inferior
Officer” within the meaning of this Clause, with the result
that, absent Presidential appointment, he must be appointed
by a court of law or the head of a department. I do not agree,
however, with the Court’s conclusion that the Tax Court is a
“Court of Law” within the meaning of this provision. I would
114
115
116
117
118
119
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find the appointment valid because the Tax Court is a
“Department” and the Chief Judge is its head.120
Justice Scalia, therefore, devoted the majority of his concurrence to
explaining why the Tax Court is a “Department” and not a “Court of Law,”
though the distinction was irrelevant to the outcome in Freytag itself.
In his opinion, Justice Scalia cited seven papers from The
Federalist.121 The first citation was to No. 78, in order to show that “Courts
of Law” in the Appointments Clause can only refer to Article III courts, and
not Article I courts.122 Justice Scalia noted that the Framers only
contemplated Article III courts, and cited as evidence the portion in No. 78
where Publius writes that “all judges who may be appointed by the United
States are to hold their offices during good behavior[] . . . .”123 Since Article
I judges do not have life tenure and permanent salary, argued Justice Scalia,
they cannot be the “Courts of Law” comprehended by the Appointments
Clause.124
Justice Scalia went on to provide a concise intellectual history of the
purpose of separating the power to make offices from the power to appoint
the holders of those offices.125 In doing so, Justice Scalia enlisted Nos. 76,
49, 48, 73, 51, 78, and 79 of The Federalist.126 After quoting the scarier
passages about the legislature from Nos. 48 and 49, Justice Scalia explained
that permanent salary for both the President and the Judiciary was an essential
aspect of the separation of powers, in that it provided independence from the
legislature.127 This independence is crucial in the appointment context so that
Congress cannot influence the appointers, thereby controlling both the
creation of, and the appointment to, an office.128 Justice Scalia called the
majority’s disposition destructive of this “carefully constructed scheme” by
theoretically allowing Article I judges to appoint officers without the
protections from Congress’s influence of life tenure and permanent salary.129
Ultimately, Justice Scalia still found the Tax Court to be a Department within
the Executive Branch, with a Head (the Chief Judge) removable by the
President.130 A crucial feature of his disposition here is that the Chief Judge
of the Tax Court is removable for “inefficiency,” a leeway that Justice Scalia
120
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described as “very broad[,]” allowing the President, rather than Congress, to
maintain control over the Chief Judge (and hence his appointments).131
It is interesting to see such combative words between concurrences
on an issue that seems to be a mere technicality. After all, why should it
matter too much whether we categorize the Tax Court as a “Department” or
a “Court of Law,” when all agree the appointment is valid? Justice Scalia’s
point was to warn against Congress vesting appointment power in Article I
courts, and then being able to influence those appointments through the ability
to raise or lower the judges’ salaries.132 The majority, on the other hand,
opined that “[g]iven the inexorable presence of the administrative state, a
holding that every organ in the Executive Branch is a department would
multiply indefinitely the number of actors eligible to appoint.”133
What does The Federalist have to say about this difference? Justice
Scalia marshaled a number of papers in his exposition of the nature of
appointing, and the necessity of independence. The quotations are used rather
modestly and unobjectionably, and taken together, do make the reader hesitate
at the notion of an Article I judge having the power to appoint, with Congress
simultaneously having the power over that judge’s salary. The majority
seemed to miss this point when it concluded that the Tax Court is independent
of Congress because Congress cannot review its decisions.134 Justice Scalia,
on the other hand, ably used The Federalist as an historical source to
demonstrate the nature of appointment power during the founding period, and
to explain that the necessary independence in this context refers to salary, not
reviewability. In addition to using The Federalist to connect the concept of
separation of powers with permanent salary, Justice Scalia used No. 78 as an
interpretive piece in his originalist reading of the term “Courts of Law,” to
push back at the majority’s view that “[t]he Tax Court exercises judicial
power to the exclusion of any other function.”135 Even those who oppose such
originalist interpretations in general might appreciate the connection between
the textual point about “Courts of Law” and the deeper, more important
argument that Justice Scalia made about the necessity of permanent salary (or
for “heads of departments[,]” being “directly answerable to the
President[]”136) for the power of appointment.
Though Justice Scalia made good use of The Federalist in Freytag,
he opted for a block quote from James Wilson about the problems with bodies
of people making appointments, instead of the similar discussion from No. 76
of The Federalist, though Justice Scalia cited No. 76 (without discussion) as
131
132
133
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additional support for Wilson’s comments.137 The majority seemed to have
misunderstood this rationale for the Appointments Clause. Immediately
before expressing its fear of too many administrative bodies having
appointment power, the majority noted that the “Clause reflects our Framers’
conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic
government.”138 But the majority misunderstood the distribution problem (in
much the same way Justice Scalia misapprehended the plural executive
problem in Morrison).139 The problem is not having too many individuals
with their own individual appointments to make; rather, the Appointments
Clause takes away the ability for multiple individuals jointly to make
appointments. Justice Scalia made this point through Wilson, though it can
be made well through No. 76 of The Federalist.140
Though one might characterize Justice Scalia’s Freytag concurrence
as a bit pedantic, he did make strong points undercutting the majority’s
reasoning. The majority seemed to have common sense (the “Tax Court”) on
its side, but Justice Scalia, through multiple citations to The Federalist,
demonstrated not just that his interpretation comports with the Founders’
understanding, but also why it makes sense for us to see it his way today too.
E. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.
Plaut is the first case discussed in this Article where we find Justice
Scalia writing for the Court.141 The circumstances that birthed the case are
rather interesting. On June 20, 1991, the Court rendered two decisions—
Lampf and Beam—which together had an unfortunate result. Lampf
established a statute of limitations for actions brought under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.142 Beam held “that a new rule of federal law that is
applied to the parties in the case announcing the rule must be applied as well
to all cases pending on direct review.”143 Because of these two holdings, a
certain class of people with pending securities’ claims that were timely filed
before June 20, 1991—the standard beforehand depending on state law—now
found their claims barred due to the new statute of limitations announced by
Lampf, and immediately employed to pending cases because of Beam.144
Congress and the President acted to rectify this situation, and in December of
1991 passed a statute allowing those deprived of their cases in this way to
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have them re-instated.145
Plaut invalidated this statute on the grounds that it violated separation
of powers because the legislature passed retroactive legislation that re-opened
final judicial judgments.146 As part of a long, historical account of American
opposition to legislative judgments, Justice Scalia invoked Nos. 48, 81, and
78 of The Federalist.147 Ultimately, the decision was based on the separation
of powers principle as espoused in Justice Scalia’s history—“Section 27A(b)
effects a clear violation of the separation-of-powers principle we have just
discussed[]”148—and though there were many sources, The Federalist was
nonetheless one of the main sources for establishing the notion of a strict rule
against legislative undoing of judicial decisions.
Justice Scalia first cited to No. 48 for its examples from Virginia and
Pennsylvania of legislative interference with judgments, to demonstrate that
this concern underlies the establishment of a separate judiciary.149 He then
provided a block quote from No. 81, ostensibly to demonstrate “the principle
effect” of the separate branches: that “[a] legislature without exceeding its
province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case;
though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.”150 But Justice Scalia
included a few sentences from No. 81 before the one just quoted, and seemed
to miss, or misread, a portion of it.151 There, Publius writes: “It is not true, in
the second place, that the Parliament of Great Britain, or the legislatures of
the particular States, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their
respective courts, in any other sense than might be done by a future legislature
of the United States.”152 One clause of that sentence—“than might be
done”153—demonstrates that Publius in this paper clearly conceived that there
are some (even if rare) circumstances where legislatures can rectify decisions.
Justice Scalia then provided some miscellaneous quotations from No.
78 attesting to the weakness of the Judiciary. He wrote, quoting No. 78: “The
Judiciary would be, ‘from the nature of its functions, . . . the [department]
least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution,’ not because its acts
were subject to legislative correction, but because the binding effect of its acts
was limited to particular cases and controversies.”154 This characterization
takes the quote from No. 78 somewhat out of context. In this passage, as
discussed above, Publius notes that the weakness of the Judiciary stems from
145
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its having “no influence over either the sword or the purse[]” (or the army and
the government’s money).155 Though this is not unrelated to the limitation of
the judiciary to cases and controversies, this citation again shows Justice
Scalia taking a helpful phrase out of its particular context in The Federalist.
In any case, it is hard to avoid the notion that the Judiciary is not
always just deciding a single case. The effect of its combined judgments on
June 20, 1991 robbed a “[a] large class of investors [who] reasonably and in
good faith thought they possessed rights of action” of those rights.156
Congress simply wanted to restore these rights. Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
noted the uniqueness and rigidity of the Court’s approach to the case,
highlighting that the Court had “never invalidated such a law on separationof-powers grounds until today[]” and that “only last Term we recognized
Congress’ ample power to enact a law that ‘in effect ‘restored’ rights . . . .’”157
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately because he
disagreed with a per se rule against retroactive legislation, noting, right before
citing No. 48 of The Federalist, that “the unnecessary building of such walls
is, in itself, dangerous, because the Constitution blends, as well as separates,
powers in its effort to create a government that will work for, as well as protect
the liberties of, its citizens.”158 Justice Breyer ultimately concurred, not
simply because the statute at issue was retroactive, but because it also lacked
what Justice Breyer called “the liberty-protecting assurances that
prospectivity and greater generality would have provided[] . . . .”159 Justice
Breyer found the statute problematic because it was under-inclusive: it failed
to account for those who were in good faith relying on pre-Lampf limitations,
but had not yet filed an action.160 Justice Breyer might ultimately have struck
the right balance in this instance—respecting the separation of powers but not
participating in the “unnecessary building of . . . walls” that the Court, through
Justice Scalia, undertook.161
F. NLRB v. Canning
Separation of powers and The Federalist again took center stage in
the final decision published by the Supreme Court in the 2013–2014 term,
Canning, which was the first time the Supreme Court ever interpreted the
Recess Appointments Clause.162 Though all nine justices concurred in the
judgment rejecting several of President Obama’s appointments to the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), the Court split into two opinions
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
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along familiar political lines, with Justice Breyer writing for the liberal-plusJustice Kennedy majority, and Justice Scalia writing for the conservativeminus-Justice Kennedy minority concurrence. Both opinions supplemented
traditional constitutional analysis tools, such as close textual reading and
discussion of the Framers’ intent, with extensive reviews of the use of recess
appointments throughout American history. Because of the first-impression
interpretation of the Constitution and the myriad of interpretive debates that
arise between the two opinions, the case is particularly ripe for discussion and
analysis from a variety of angles. Leaving much of this work for a different
day or other writers, this section will first summarize the central views of both
opinions, and then address the role The Federalist plays in them.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion divided the case into three
inquiries. The first was whether “the recess” in the Recess Appointments
Clause refers to just inter-session recesses (that is, formal recesses between
two separate congressional sessions), or both inter- and intra-session recesses
(that is, informal recesses that pop up within a particular congressional
session).163 The second was whether the words of the Clause “vacancies that
may happen during the recess” comprehend only vacancies that arise during
the recess itself, or whether they also comprehend vacancies that existed prior
to the recess.164 The majority’s third inquiry was into the particular length of
the recess at issue in the case, and whether that length is sufficient to trigger
the recess appointment power.165
The majority found the text ambiguous as to whether it encompasses
intra-session recesses. It then held that “the Clause’s purpose demands the
broader interpretation[,]” explaining that since the Clause empowers the
President to “ensure the continued functioning of the Federal Government
when the Senate is away[,]” and “[t]he Senate is equally away during . . . an
intra-session recess,” the broader interpretation makes more sense.166 The
majority opinion then marshaled evidence that past practice vindicates this
interpretation.167 This holding, however, contained a caveat that intra-session
recesses shorter than three days are not long enough to trigger the power,
drawn from language in “[t]he Adjournments Clause [that] reflects the fact
that a 3-day break is not a significant interruption of legislative business.”168
Additionally, since the majority had found no historical examples of an
appointment in an intra-session recess of fewer than ten days, it held that
appointments during recesses of three through ten days are “presumptively
too short [as well].”169 This holding would eventually resolve the third
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at 2556.
Id. at 2567.
Id. at 2573.
Id. at 2561.
Id. at 2561–64.
Id. at 2566.
Id. at 2554.
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inquiry, after the majority examined the necessary formal requirements that
constitute the Senate being in session for purposes of the Clause.170 Finding
pro forma sessions to qualify, the majority invalidated President Obama’s
appointments that came during a recess of only three days between two pro
forma sessions.171 The Solicitor General had urged the Court to adopt the
view that pro forma sessions, during which there would be “no business . . .
transacted,” should be treated as periods of recess.172
Between its holding defining “recess,” and its application of that
holding, the majority also held that the Clause’s purpose “strongly supports”
the broader interpretation of vacancies that happen to arise—namely that the
Clause empowers the President to fill vacancies that arise prior to a recess in
addition to those that arise during the recess itself.173 The majority
acknowledged the reductio ad absurdum weaknesses of both positions.174 It
noted that if the Clause covered only those vacancies that occur during a
recess, it would hamstring the President from filling an office that was vacated
immediately before the recess, when the President had no chance to find out
about the vacancy or find a replacement.175 The majority saw this as a clear
frustration of the purpose of the Clause, as it would undercut government
functioning solely because a vacancy may have happened a minute before the
recess started, rather than a minute afterward.176 At the same time, the
majority recognized a point later raised by Justice Scalia,177 that the “broad
interpretation might permit a President to avoid Senate confirmations as a
matter of course.”178 The majority ultimately chose to live with the latter
problem, explaining that reputational interests and the Senate’s “political
resources” would help keep the President in check.179 As a last resort, the
Senate could “remain in session, preventing recess appointments by refusing
to take a recess.”180 As with the first inquiry, the majority supported its
reasoning by reference to historical evidence, noting that “we think it is a fair
inference that a large proportion of the recess appointments in the history of
the Nation have filled pre-existing vacancies.”181
Justice Scalia concurred in invalidating the specific appointments at
170

Id. at 2567–77.
Id. at 2573–75.
172
Id. at 2573–74.
173
Id. at 2567–68.
174
Id. at 2566.
175
Id. at 2568.
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Id.
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Id. at 2607 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Id. at 2569 (majority opinion).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 2571. “The upshot is that the President has consistently and frequently interpreted the Recess
Appointments Clause to apply to vacancies that initially occur before, but continue to exist during, a recess
of the Senate. The Senate as a body has not encountered this practice for nearly three-quarters of a century,
perhaps longer.” Id. at 2573.
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issue, but strongly disagreed with the majority’s method and holdings.182 As
to method, Justice Scalia disagreed that past practice should play a role in the
court’s decision, as “a necessary corollary of the principle that the political
branches cannot by agreement alter the constitutional structure.”183 Justice
Scalia did end up discussing historical practice at length, but only to rebuff
the majority’s historical discussion.184 With respect to the Court’s twin
holdings that “Recess” comprehends intra-session recesses, and that the
Clause empowers the President to fill vacancies that arise prior to a recess,
Justice Scalia noted that they are “inconsistent with the Constitution’s text
and structure[] . . . .”185
Justice Scalia began his textual analysis of the first issue by raising a
basic linguistic problem that the majority left unaddressed.186 He looked at
the whole Clause, which ends by providing that the recess appointees’
commissions “shall expire at the End of their next Session[,]” and noted that
“the Clause uses the term ‘Recess’ in contradistinction to the term
‘Session.’”187 Justice Scalia then pointed out that the majority never claimed
that the word “Session” in the Clause is used informally as well, and argues
that “[i]t is linguistically implausible to suppose—as the majority does—that
the Clause uses one of those terms (‘Recess’) informally and the other
(‘Session’) formally in a single sentence, with the result that an event can
occur during both the ‘Recess’ and the ‘Session.’”188 The majority attempted
to placate the practical worries that this would allow for recess appointees to
serve for over a year (because they serve until the end of Congress’ “next
session”),189 but it did not address the logical and linguistic problem raised by
Justice Scalia. Indeed, it does seem strange for one word in the Clause to be
interpreted informally and the other formally.190
Justice Scalia’s linguistic point can be inferred from the plain text of
the Clause itself. However, he chose to cite to No. 67 of The Federalist
immediately after noting that the words “Recess” and “Session” are used “in
contradistinction.”191 Justice Scalia continued: “As Alexander Hamilton
wrote: ‘The time within which the power is to operate “during the recess of
182
Id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating, “The real tragedy of today’s decision . . . is the damage
done to our separation-of-powers jurisprudence more generally.”).
183
Id. at 2594.
184
Id. at 2600–17.
185
Id. at 2595–606.
186
Id. at 2595–97.
187
Id. at 2592–95.
188
Id. at 2597.
189
Id. at 2565 (majority opinion).
190
If “session” were also read informally, recess appointments would only last the short duration of
the intra-session recess, which would curtail the effect of the recess appointment power. Though Justice
Scalia noted that reading both informally “would be more linguistically defensible than the majority’s
[reading,]” he nonetheless objected to both terms being read informally because it would leave “the recessappointment power without a textually grounded principle limiting the time of its exercise.” Id. at 2597
(Scalia, J., concurring).
191
Id. at 2595.
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the Senate” and the duration of the appointments “to the end of the next
session” of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision.’”192
But it is not immediately clear that these words from The Federalist support
Justice Scalia’s contradistinction point about “Recess” and “Session.” Does
the “sense of the provision” to which Publius refers mean that “Recess” and
“Session” are mutually exclusive states? It turns out that is not what Publius
was referring to at all. In fact, Publius devotes the entire No. 67 to refuting a
claim of the anti-Federalists that the Constitution would give the President
power to fill vacancies in the Senate itself.193 Publius rebuts “this instance of
misrepresentation [ ] to place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal
proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practised [sic] to prevent a fair and
impartial judgment of the real merits of the Constitution . . . .”194
Publius’s elucidation of the recess appointment power in No. 67 is
therefore catered to show that it does not empower Presidents to appoint
Senators. It does not elaborate on the full extent or nature of the power itself,
and never addresses the issue of informal recesses. Moreover, the very
sentence that Justice Scalia quoted clearly refers to the main issue actually
under discussion in No. 67. The “sense of the provision” does not refer to the
contradistinction between “Recess” and “Session,” but rather to the fact that
the Clause does not empower the President to appoint Senators.195 As Publius
explains, the time and duration portions of the Clause (“during the recess of
the Senate” and “to the end of the next session”)196
conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision which, if it
had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally
have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the
recess of the State legislatures, who are to make the
permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the national
Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments;
and would have extended the duration in office of the
temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of
the State . . . .197
It is puzzling that Justice Scalia would pluck these words out of context for
the opening paragraph of his textual analysis of “Recess,” particularly when
he cited another section from No. 67 to make the same point later on, but did
so in a parenthetical citation rather than in the introductory sentences of his
central analysis.198 Perhaps he thought “conspire to elucidate the sense of the
192

Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 2, at 410 (Alexander Hamilton)).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 2, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton).
194
Id. at 411.
195
Id. at 410.
196
Id. (emphasis added). Here, Publius (or Hamilton) had a slightly different wording than the Clause,
which states “at the End of their next Session.” Id.
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Id.
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NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2596 (2014) (Scalia, J. concurring).
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provision[]” would be a stylish way to begin his textual analysis.199 Whatever
the reason, Justice Scalia should have gone with the less flashy quote from
No. 67 that he later did use. That way, when attempting to hew closely to the
plain meaning of the Constitution by calling upon the understanding of one
of its Framers, he would not simultaneously veer from the context of that
understanding.
Justice Scalia made the same general mistake when he used No. 67 to
elucidate the words “that may happen during the recess . . . .”200 Disagreeing
with the majority that this phrase comprehends vacancies that arise prior to
the relevant recess, he noted that if that were the case, the President could
avoid Senate confirmation for all appointments by simply waiting to fill any
vacancy until the next recess.201 Justice Scalia argued that this reading
“distorts [the Clause’s] constitutional role, which was meant to be
subordinate.”202 His source for the proposition that the Clause’s role is
subordinate is once again No. 67 from The Federalist. Justice Scalia
explained, incorporating quotes from No. 67, that “appointment with the
advice and consent of the Senate was to be ‘the general mode of appointing
officers of the United States’” and that “the Recess Appointments Clause was
therefore understood to be ‘nothing more than a supplement’ to the ‘general
method’ of advice and consent.”203
Though these words on their face support Justice Scalia’s
propositions, they are once again taken from their original context. As noted
above, Publius in No. 67 is simply demonstrating that the recess appointment
power does not include the ability to appoint Senators. One of the reasons
why anti-Federalists could make this argument at all is because unlike the
general Appointments Clause, which empowers the President to appoint those
officers “whose appointments are not . . . otherwise provided for [in the
Constitution,]” the Recess Appointments Clause contains no such limitation
in its own sentence.204 This left some small room for those trying “to
disfigure” or “to metamorphose” the Constitution to claim that the Clause
empowers the President to fill any vacancy, including those officers whose
appointment is provided for in the Constitution, such as Senators.205 Publius,
disproving the anti-Federalists, explains:
The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be
understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in
the Senate, for the following reasons:––First. The relation in
199

Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2567 (majority opinion).
201
Id. at 2607 (Scalia, J. concurring).
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 2, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton); see also U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 3.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 2, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton).
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which that clause stands to the other, which declares the
general mode of appointing officers of the United States,
denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other
for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of
appointment, in cases to which the general method was
inadequate.206
Publius’ point here, therefore, is to connect the two Clauses—to show that the
general appointment power and the recess appointment power work on the
same objects, if lacking the same form. Though he does use the words
“supplement” and “auxiliary,” and would likely not deny Justice Scalia’s
point that the recess appointment power should not be used as a matter of
common course, Publius is not concerned in No. 67 with delineating the lines
between the “general” and “auxiliary” methods of appointment. His goal was
to unite the Clauses such that the powers they authorize are understood to
contain the same objects—namely officers “whose appointments are not in
the Constitution otherwise provided for.”207
Perhaps as striking as Justice Scalia’s out-of-context quotations from
No. 67 is his lack of attention to No. 76, which is the paper that elaborates on
the nature of the appointment power and the Senatorial check on
nominations.208 Indeed the majority quoted a portion from No. 76 to note
both the reason for a unitary nominator, as well the purpose for the Senate’s
check.209 But rather than call upon The Federalist to discuss these underlying
“originalist” purposes, Justice Scalia selectively culled language from a
separate discussion in No. 67, which did not actually “elucidate the sense of
the provision[]” in the way Justice Scalia was attempting.210 The majority
outdrew Justice Scalia by at least citing the main points from No. 76, and
likely maddened him with perhaps the quirkiest and most charming use of a
Federalist citation in Supreme Court jurisprudence: the majority cited
Publius’s reference in No. 18 to “the recess of the Senate [of an ancient
Achaean league]”211 to show that the word “the” does not necessarily refer to
“a particular thing[,]” but may refer “to a term used generically or
universally[,]”212 in order to demonstrate that the plain meaning of “the
Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause need not refer to a particular—
and therefore the formal, annual—recess of the Senate. One might have
expected Justice Scalia to produce such a careful textualist argument. But
alas, he is the Justice who misappropriated an originalist source in Canning.
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G. Justice Scalia’s Federalist on Separation-of-Powers: Form Over
Function and Words Out of Context
Taken together, the cases discussed in this Part show Justice Scalia
repeatedly excerpting The Federalist to demand strict adherence to an
ostensibly originalist understanding of particular separation of powers
structures. At the same time, he seemed to overlook many other passages that
undercut the notion that the original understanding of separation of powers
was more concerned with the formal minutiae than the functional purpose of
properly separated and fortified branches. For example, in No. 51, after the
articulation of the separation of powers principle itself, Publius proclaims,
“Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”213 In No. 40,
he writes, “the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to
the means.”214 In more words in No. 31, he explains, that “[a] government
ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of
the objects committed to its care . . . free from every other control but a regard
to the public good and to the sense of the people.”215 And again, in No. 45,
Publius writes that “the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the
people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government
whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this
object.”216 But more concerning than Justice Scalia’s overemphasis on
particulars at the expense of these broader themes is his repeated mistake of
taking originalist sources out of context. Though Justice Scalia gives a useful
history lesson in Freytag, his contextual errors or omissions with respect to
his Federalist citations in Young, Morrison, Plaut, and Canning are a useful
reminder that a self-professed originalist should not and does not have a
monopoly on the Framers’ understanding.
III. FEDERALISM
A. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue
In Tyler Pipe, the Court faced a challenge to a Washington State
manufacturing tax exemption for any person subject to the state’s wholesale
tax on that same item.217 The Court found that this tax impermissibly
interfered with interstate commerce, because it burdened Washington
manufacturers who sell interstate to the benefit of Washington manufacturers
who sell locally.218 The Court phrased its conclusion in those terms, although
213

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 324 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 2, at 216 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 23,
supra note 2, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he persons, from whose agency the attainment of any end
is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.”).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra note 2 (Alexander Hamilton).
216
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 2, at 289 (James Madison).
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such a tax exemption also burdened out-of-state manufacturers subject to
manufacturing taxes elsewhere, who are then also taxed on wholesale in
Washington. Justice Scalia dissented from this aspect of the Court’s holding,
noting that in his view the Commerce Clause only gives power to Congress
to pass regulations, and does not authorize the Supreme Court to invalidate a
statute.219 He noted that previous decisions striking down state tax schemes
that discriminated against out-of-state citizens did so under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.220
Part of Justice Scalia’s argument is that the Commerce Clause was
understood at the time of the founding only to grant Congress power, not to
authorize the Court to invalidate state law. His evidence included No. 45 of
The Federalist, which says that the Commerce Clause was one “which few
oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained.”221 Justice Scalia
inferred from this line, and a few other sources stating that the Commerce
Clause was uncontroversial, that the understanding then must have excluded
Supreme Court review under the Clause, because if it included it, then there
would have been controversy. It is a roundabout argument, but coherent to
some extent.
To be sure, Justice Scalia admitted that The Federalist extols “the
virtues of free trade and the need for uniformity and national control of
commercial regulation[]” and cited, without discussion, Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42,
and 53.222 He argued however, that these papers said little of substance about
the Clause itself, and therefore went on to make the assumption he does based
on No. 45.223
But No. 42 does refer to the Commerce Clause, and it actually seems
to provide some positive support for Justice Scalia. Publius, in the middle of
the paper, gets to the “third class” of federal government powers, “which
provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States.”224 He
continues:
Under this head might be included the particular restraints
imposed on the authority of the States and certain powers of
the judicial department; [but] the former are reserved for a
distinct class and the latter will be particularly examined
when we arrive at the structure and organization of the
government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the
remaining powers . . . to wit: to regulate commerce among
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the several States . . . .225
After listing more powers such as naturalization and bankruptcy, Publius
devotes the next paragraph to a discussion of the Commerce Clause, though
without referring to it as such.226 Since Publius explicitly reserved discussion
of “particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States and certain
powers of the judicial department[,]”227 and then goes on to discuss the
Commerce Clause, it would seem natural to conclude that Publius did not
view the Commerce Clause itself as endowing judicially imposed restrictions
on States, though it still seems such restrictions, according to Publius, might
otherwise be viable.
While potentially missing his best originalist source in The Federalist
No. 42, Justice Scalia simultaneously downplayed a number of passages he
cited without discussion from The Federalist in an effort to quickly bypass
their federally oriented attitudes toward regulation of commerce. One paper
he did not cite, No. 23, lists “regulation of commerce” as one of the “principal
purposes to be answered by union . . . .”228 In No. 23, Publius argues that the
government “must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations
which have relation to” national defense.229 In the next sentence, Publius
writes that “[t]he same must be the case in respect to commerce[] . . . .”230
Certainly this passage, which did not limit its language to the legislature, and
similar ones throughout The Federalist should give one pause before
grounding in The Federalist a limit to what the federal government can do
with respect to interstate commerce.
B. Printz v. United States
Printz is arguably the Supreme Court opinion in which The Federalist
plays the most prominent role.231 The Federalist is cited by all four opinions,
and for a total of over fifty citations.232 Dissenting, Justice Souter went so far
as to state: “In deciding these cases, which I have found closer than I had
anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines my position.”233
The basic issue at stake in Printz was a question of federalism: could
the federal government enlist state officials in the application of a federal
law?234 In Printz, the specific issue was whether the federal government could
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Id. at 267–68.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 2, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Id. at 155.
See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Melton, Jr. & Miller, supra note 5, at 425–28.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 902 (majority opinion).
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require state officials to do a background check on gun purchasers.235
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion striking down the provisions
that required state officials to do background checks.236 In doing so, Justice
Scalia simply relied on a generalized “principle” of federalism: “It is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no
comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that
fundamental defect.”237 In applying this principle, Justice Scalia noted that
“[b]ecause there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the
answer to the . . . challenge must be sought in historical understanding and
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this
Court.”238
Much of the “historical understanding” portion of the opinion
discussed Nos. 27, 36, and 44 of The Federalist. In discussing these papers,
Justice Scalia was responding to arguments put forth by the government and
Justice Souter in his dissent. Justice Souter thought the selections
demonstrate that Hamilton (in 27 and 36) and Madison (in 44) both thought
that the federal government could employ the state executive to enforce
federal law.239 Justice Scalia disagreed, and thought Nos. 27 and 36 were best
reconciled with his view, and found No. 44 to be very strong proof that the
federal government could not, according to Madison, employ the state
executive.240
The debate between the two Justices over these portions was overly
academic, and I will not replay the entire bout here. Overall, a careful reading
shows that Justice Souter had the more reasonable case,241 although the backand-forth between the two Justices seems to have gilded the lily more than
anything else. Justice Scalia revealed some weakness in a footnote, where he
conceded that even if Justice Souter were right about No. 27, and hence
Hamilton’s views, those views should not be relied upon because “[t]hat
would be crediting the most expansive view of federal authority ever
expressed, and from the pen of the most expansive expositor of federal
power.”242 Justice Scalia continued in his footnote that
[t]o choose Hamilton’s view . . . is to turn a blind eye to the
fact that it was Madison’s--not Hamilton’s--that prevailed,
not only at the Constitutional Convention and in popular
sentiment, . . . but in the subsequent struggle to fix the
235
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meaning of the Constitution by early congressional practice[]
. . . .243
It is quite striking to see Justice Scalia, a proclaimed devotee and one of the
most frequent citers of The Federalist, disclaim Hamilton’s views in these
terms.
In the second portion of his opinion on constitutional structure,
Justice Scalia twice cited to No. 15, including for the proposition that “[t]he
Framers’ experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them
that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was both
ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict.”244 Justice Stevens
properly rebuffed Justice Scalia’s misconstrued interpretation of No. 15:
The basic change in the character of the government that the
Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of the
national government, not to provide some new, unmentioned
immunity for state officers. Because indirect control over
individual citizens (“the only proper objects of government”)
was ineffective under the Articles of Confederation,
Alexander Hamilton explained that “we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens.”245
Throughout the section on constitutional structure, Justice Scalia used small
excerpts from a number of the other papers. He cited No. 39 for its reference
to the States’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” as evidence of the
Constitution’s conferral of dual sovereignty.246 He even snuck in a separation
of powers point, citing No. 70 to argue that the ability to employ state
executives would undercut the President’s power.247
All in all, Justice Scalia used The Federalist quite extensively in
Printz to support his view that the historical understanding at the time of the
founding, as well as the constitutional structure itself, called for the
invalidation of the federal background check requirement. In doing so,
however, Justice Scalia was challenged strongly on his interpretation of The
Federalist, and he ultimately gave some ground by dismissing the views of
the very author (Hamilton) he so frequently cites and continued to cite in the
rest of his Printz opinion. I wonder if Justice Scalia would have disclaimed
all of Publius’s The Federalist had Justice Stevens or Souter quoted the
following passage from Madison’s No. 45:
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[I]f, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the
people of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an
objection to a government, without which the objects of the
Union cannot be attained, that such a government may
derogate from the importance of the governments of the
individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution
effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the
precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned
substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America
should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the
governments of the individual States, that particular
municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of
power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
sovereignty?248
C. Justice Scalia’s Federalist on Federalism
Justice Scalia’s use of The Federalist in federalism cases has some of
the same problems as his citations to it in separation of powers cases. He
excerpts helpful nuggets (e.g., the “inviolable sovereignty” of the states),
while ignoring passages that cut strongly against his views (e.g., the block
quote from No. 45 at the end of the previous section). He is also prone, as his
error with respect to No. 15 in Printz demonstrates, to take sections of The
Federalist out of context to make a point distinct from Publius’s. Justice
Scalia’s use of The Federalist in these two cases demonstrates not only that
originalist sources can be misused, but also that there can be rigorous
disagreement over the meaning of originalist sources. And so as with the
separation of powers cases, these federalism cases call into question the
notion of a particular and discernable original understanding.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Norman v. Reed
In Norman, the Court took issue with certain requirements for
establishing political parties and running new party candidates in Cook
County, Illinois.249 One of the central flaws was that Illinois required more
signatures in order to field new candidates within Cook County itself than it
required for statewide elections.250 In a short and lone dissent, Justice Scalia,
citing No. 10 of The Federalist, speculated that a potential reason for such a
distinction might be that the dangers of factionalism are more acute in a
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smaller political body.251 Justice Scalia’s justifying rationale for making it
more difficult to field new-party candidates in a county than in the entire state
was that
[t]here is not much chance the State as a whole will be
hamstrung by a multitude of so-called “parties,” each of
which represents the sectional interest of only one or a few
districts; there is a real possibility that the Cook County
Board will be stalemated by an equal division between “City
Party” and “County Party” members.252
But while Justice Scalia was right that the dangers of factionalism increase in
a smaller body, he was wrong in characterizing the problem of factionalism.
That problem is not that the government “will be hamstrung” or
“stalemated.”253 Quite the opposite: that is the benefit of having more
factions. No. 10 of The Federalist idealized stalemate as protective of
minority classes:
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength and to act in unison with each other. Besides other
impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes,
communication is always checked by distrust in proportion
to the number whose concurrence is necessary.254
In short, because smaller political units—such as counties—naturally tend to
have fewer factions, it is precisely in those units where great factional
diversity should be facilitated, rather than in states which—because of their
“[e]xtend[ed] . . . sphere” inherently “take in a greater variety of parties and
interests[] . . . .”255 Justice Scalia’s understanding in Norman had Publius’s
famous No. 10 backwards.
B. United States v. Hatter
Hatter found the Court analyzing the Compensation Clause. At issue
was the constitutionality of two taxes—Medicare and Social Security—that
Congress extended to federal judges (along with the rest of federal
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employees).256 Both the majority and Justice Scalia (though not Justice
Thomas) agreed that Congress can levy taxes on federal judges during their
tenure, so long as those taxes were general taxes levied on the public at
large.257 But since the judges were formerly exempt from the two taxes at
issue here, the Court had to assess whether losing exemptions counted as
reductions in compensation.
The majority accurately cited Nos. 78 and 79 of The Federalist to
demonstrate that the purpose of the Compensation Clause was to provide
judges with the requisite independence from Congress.258 In this light, the
majority found the extension of the Medicare tax constitutional because
Congress extended it to all federal employees, and “[i]n practice, the
likelihood that a nondiscriminatory tax represents a disguised legislative
effort to influence the judicial will is virtually nonexistent. Hence the
potential threats to judicial independence that underlie the Constitution’s
compensation guarantee cannot justify a special judicial exemption from a
commonly shared tax[] . . . .”259 However, because of a particular exemption
procedure for the Social Security tax, “[t]he practical upshot [was] that the
law permitted nearly every current federal employee, but not federal judges,
to avoid the newly imposed financial obligation.”260 Because the Social
Security tax was effectively extended only to federal judges, and not federal
employees generally, the majority found it to violate the purpose of the
Compensation Clause.261
Justice Scalia did not delve into the purpose of the Compensation
Clause, and instead focused on the difference between the terms of
compensation, and the value of compensation. Through a reading of two
portions of No. 79, Justice Scalia deduced that Publius (or Hamilton, as the
opinion noted) did not think that inflation diminishes compensation itself (i.e.
its terms), though it obviously diminishes the value of the terms of
compensation.262 The upshot of this point is that Congress does not have to
raise judges’ nominal salaries to keep pace with inflation. In line with this
formal analysis of the difference between the terms and value of
compensation, Justice Scalia concluded that both taxes were unconstitutional
because any “tax-free status conditioned on federal employment is
compensation, and its elimination a reduction.”263 Whether there was specific
targeting of judges was irrelevant. The only relevant fact for Justice Scalia
was that the terms of compensation, not just the value of compensation, was
256
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reduced—a reduction that is per se unconstitutional.
In many ways, Hatter is predictable: Justice Breyer, writing for the
Court, dove into the purpose of the Compensation Clause, while Justice Scalia
abided by a stricter textualist interpretation, without consideration of the
Clause’s purpose. But both Justices cited to The Federalist for support,
highlighting that the original understanding of a Clause’s function, and the
original definitions of a Clause’s words, can yield different interpretive
results.
C. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
This Article ends with a relatively unique case. In Hamdi, Justices
Scalia and Stevens—usually sparring partners, as in Printz—dissented
together in a decision written by Justice Scalia.264 The plurality held that
Congress, through the Authorization for Use of Military Force, authorized
petitioner Hamdi’s detention, and did not reach the government’s argument
that “the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article
II of the Constitution.”265
Justice Scalia, at the outset of his dissent, cited No. 84 twice and No.
83 as evidence of the importance of habeas corpus to the Founders.266 Later
in the opinion, he reflected on “the Founders’ general mistrust of military
power permanently at the Executive’s disposal[,]” and went on to cite No.
45.267 He added, without citation, that at least ten papers in The Federalist
were devoted in part to assuaging fears about standing armies during
peacetime.268 He also quoted from No. 69, where Publius describes the
President’s military power as inferior to the British King’s power, and lacking
in the ability to declare war.269 Justice Scalia summed up his reflections on
these portions of The Federalist, stating: “A view of the Constitution that
gives the Executive authority to use military force rather than the force of law
against citizens on American soil flies in the face of the mistrust that
engendered these provisions.”270 And finally, in his penultimate paragraph,
Justice Scalia offered a block quote from No. 8 of The Federalist, in which
Publius forebodes how people will be willing to give up liberty for security.271
Throughout the opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the Constitution, as
illuminated by the Framers and particularly through The Federalist, has a
manifest tenor that is suspicious of unchecked military power, and protective
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of the individual through habeas corpus.
Justice Scalia’s arguments were fair and even noble. And yet Justice
Thomas, who dissented separately on the ground that “detention falls squarely
within the Federal Government’s war powers, and [the Court] lack[s] the
expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision[,]”272 marshaled his own
support from The Federalist. He quoted from No. 23, which provides that
defense powers
ought to exist without limitation . . . [b]ecause it is impossible
to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the correspondent extent & variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite;
and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.273
Justice Thomas also cited (without quoting) to No. 34, which explains that
“[t]here ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they
may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible
safely to limit that capacity,”274 and to No. 41, which concludes that “[i]t is in
vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is
worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary
usurpations of power . . . .”275
The question is: how to respond to these unlimited grants of power to
preserve the nation? The natural response in the context of 2004 might be to
question whether the United States was really at war for its self-preservation.
Through that perspective, it seems questionable to apply the passages Justice
Thomas cited, which emanate from the experience of a nation living in the
aftermath of a more immediate and destructive war. Nonetheless, Justice
Scalia’s opinion does not dismiss the threat facing the United States, and
seems on its terms to apply to any sort of war. So while Justice Scalia’s
portrait of The Federalist’s skepticism of the military rings true with respect
to recent American military excursions, it might just be that in the face of a
greater, more destructive threat, Justice Thomas’s portrait of The Federalist’s
military attitude would be more compelling. Once again, originalist
arguments diverge.
D. Justice Scalia’s Federalist: Patterns endure
Analysis of some of the remainder cases that fall outside of the
separation of powers and federalism umbrellas supports the conclusions of
272
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the previous Parts of this Article. Norman v. Reed once again demonstrates
that even a Supreme Court Justice, and perhaps the most influential originalist
in the country, can misunderstand the lessons of the Framers. Hatter and
Hamdi, though free of manifest error in Federalist usage, demonstrate an
inevitable consequence of mining originalist understanding: further
disagreement. The varying opinions in Hatter highlight that an originalist
inquiry could yield different results depending on whether one focuses on
original understanding of the purpose of a particular constitutional feature, or
on the original understanding of the form that feature took at the time of the
founding. And Hamdi displays how two originalists could come to
diametrically opposing views in mining the same constitutional question, and
through use of the same constitutional gloss.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that Justice Scalia tended to marshal select
passages from The Federalist in order to advance a rigid doctrine of
separation of powers, and a view of federalism that gives a certain prominence
to state sovereignty. At the same time, he neglected to mention those passages
that stress the ends over the means, and the function over the form, and he
downplayed the strong federal sentiment that infuses the entirety of The
Federalist. Justice Scalia did use The Federalist in a variety of ways—as
tools for textual analysis of the Constitution’s original meaning, and as
glosses on the purpose of various constitutional provisions. But other Justices
have employed The Federalist as well, and this Article has shown that a
particular original understanding of the Constitution is elusive, even through
the lens of a single and most influential gloss. Justice Scalia has at times
exacerbated the tension between varying interpretations of The Federalist by
making more than the occasional blunder in his use of it. One would expect
a bit better from such an admirer of Publius, or James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton.
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